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COMMENTARIES ON THE PUBLIC ACTS OF
INDIANA, 1927. I: THE UNIFORM
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT1
GALITZEN A. FARABAUGH and WALTER R. ARNOLD*
SECTION 2
WHAT INTEREST NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE
PROCEEDINGS?
"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other
writing constituting a contract, * * * may have determined any ques-
tion of construction or validity arising under the instrument * * * and
obtain a declaration of right, status, or other legal relation thereunder."
The interest contemplated by the statute means a substantial
interest, not only in the contract or other subject-matter, but
in the particular question presented. It must be something more
than an academic interest or mere interest in securing the estab-
lishment of a precedent. The interest must be direct, vested,
substance perfect, and of a nature that, were a plenary action
instituted for damages by virtue of a wrong claimed to arise
from the same matter, the petitioner in declarator would be the
proper plaintiff. It means such legal interest as may, by the
decree of court, be either enlarged or diminished.52
A person has such an interest as will sustain a petition in
declarator in the subject matter, if he has some legal right or is
under some legal liability that may be enlarged or diminished by
the judgment.53
Section 3 of the code of civil procedure (Section 258 Burns'
R. S. 1926) is a most authoritative criterion, under the numerous
decisions construing that section, as to who is, and who is not,
the real party in interest. With the abundance of authority
on the subject decided under that statute, it should never become
a matter of difficulty for the court to determine whether the
parties are real parties in interest or not.
1 Continued from the February issue, 3 Ind. Law Jour. 351.
* See biographical note, p. 461.
52 Hemmingway v. Corey, 16 Vt. 225.
53 In re Clark's estate, 79 Vt. 62, 64 At. 231, 118 Am. St. Rep. 938.
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WHEN DOES A QUESTION ARISE SUBJECT TO
DECLARATION?
"Any person * * * may have determined any question of con-
struction or validity * * * and obtain a declaration of right, status
or other legal relation thereunder."
The statute contemplates a bona fide question. By "question,"
is not meant a bare uncertainty. Jurisdiction will not be as-
sumed on a mere quibble. An actual question involving substan-
tial right is essential. Not only in those courts of the United
States which recognize the action of declarator, but also in Eng-
land, it is held that it rests largely in the discretion of the court
as to whether or not the matter is of judicial cognizance so as
to vest the court with jurisdiction.54
Jurisdiction will never be assumed unless the tribunal ap-
pealed to is satisfied, that an actual controversy, or the ripening
seeds of one, exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris
and before the court so that the declaration sought will be of
practical assistance in ending the controversy. 55
An action of declarator will not lie where the happening of
an event, which will make the declaration effective, is but prob-
lematical-an event which may never happen. The court will
wait until the event actually takes place-unless special circum-
stances appear which warrant an immediate decision, as for in-
stance where present rights depend on the declaration sought
by plaintiff.5 6
It was held by the judicial committee of the House of Lords :57
"The question must be real, and not theoretical; the person raising it
must have a real interest to raise it; he must be able to secure the proper
contradictor, that is to say, someone presently existing who has a true
interest to oppose the declaration sought. The statute does not contemplate
declarations upon remote contingencies or where the question arises out of a
closed incident. No declaration is rendered which can only serve an ex-
pression upon a supposititious case. Parties are not entitled to an expres-
sion of opinion to help them in another transaction. Barwick v. South-
eastern & County Railroad Company, 1 K. B. 187. Nor should a declaration
54 Byson v. Attorney General, 1 K. B. 410; Bramen v. Babcock, 98 Conn.
549, 120 At. 150; British South Africa Co. v. Companhia DeMocambique,
2 Q. B. 58; Karihir's Petition, 131 AtI. 265. But see Greene v. Holbrook, 220
N. Y. S. 151.
55 Lewis v. Green, 2 Chancery, 340; Stada v. Board of Commissioners,
117 Kans. 150, 230 Pac. 531; Axton v. Goodman, 205 Ky. 382, 265 S. W.
806; Ezzell v. Exall, 207 Ky. 615, 269 S. W. 752; Holt v. Custer County,
243 Pac. 811; West v. Wichita, 234 Pac. 978.
56 In re Staples, 1 Chan. 322; Norton v. Moran, 206 Ky. 415, 257 S. W.
171; Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 81 Conn. 500, 100 At. 22.
57 Russian Commercial and I Bank v. British Bank, 19 A. L. R. 1101.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
be made on an abstract question. Gray v. Spyer, 2 Chan. 549. Nor on re-
mote and incidental questions."5 I
The initiatory pleading must show the facts upon which the
legal relation of the complainant to defendant is based, and if
there be more than one defendant, it must show the relationship
of all so as to afford relief by declaration of the respective rights
of the parties inter sese. A declaratory judgment is essentially
one of construction and its primal purpose is the construction
of definitely stated rights and to define other legal stated rela-
tions. A determination of issues of fact between the parties will
ordinarily be relegated to the proper jurisdictional forums other-
wise provided. Very wide discretion is vested in the court to
which application is made, but it should be exercised with the
utmost caution. A demurrer on the ground of multifariousness
may be sustained because the claim of the defendant is separate
and independent.
It is not only in cases of remote contingencies that a proceed-
ing in declarator is improper, but where a plain remedy at law
or in equity exists under the facts stated or are shown at the
hearing, plaintiff must pursue it, and his petition will be dis-
missed. 59
Where it appears, ex facie the complaint, that complainant
can have no relief as against the party named as defendant, and
defendant should not be forced into a litigation which can have
no final result in favor of complainant, especially when such liti-
gation would delay defendant in the enforcement of his rights
as against complainant, a court of chancery should not undertake
to decide or declare the rights and status of parties upon a state
of facts which in future is contingent and uncertain.
Where there is no actual controversy there can be no justici-
able question and hence no jurisdiction.60
To render a question justiciable, plaintiff should aver his legal
rights in the premises and that defendant claims other or con-
trary rights or occupies some official relation thereto, with im-
posed duty, which, if exercised, would impair, thwart, obstruct,
or defeat plaintiff in his rights.
58 Goetz et al. v. Smith et al., 278 S. W. 417; Newsum et al. v. Interstate
Realty Co., Tenn. 278.
59 Loesch v. Manhattan Life Inst. Co. of New York, 218 N. Y. S. 412.
4;o Revis v. Daugherty, 287 S. W. 28 (Ky.); Burton v. Durham Realty
Co., 125 S. E. 3; Tanner v. Boynton Lbr. Co., 129 AtI. 617.
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IS RELIEF LIMITED TO DECLARATION ON WRITTEN
DOCUMENTS?
"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other
writings, constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by * * * contracts * * * may have de-
termined any question of construction or validity arising under the instru-
ment -• * * or contract * * * and obtain a declaration of right,
status, or other legal relation thereunder."
A first blush reading of this section would lead to the conclu-
sion that the legislature intended to limit declaratory judgments
to questions arising on instruments in writing; however, Section
1 is susceptible to a much broader construction, and Section 5
specifically provides that
"The enumeration in sections 2, 3 and, 4 does not limit or restrict the
exercises of the general powers conferred in section 1 in any proceeding
where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will
terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty."
Consequently the power of the court is as broad as the sub-
ject of which it deals, to-wit: "Rights, status, and other legal
relations." The English act construed in conjunction with the
general order G' assumes to cover a wide field of action. A dec-
laration on the question of fact as to whether or not under the
circumstances a crew had abandoned its ship so as to entitle the
owner of the cargo to elect to accept the cargo at the point
where the ship was brought ashore by the receiver of wrecks
without paying freight was made. 6  A question of fact was
determined as to whether or not an infant was a Roman Catholic
within the terms of a will.0 4 Whether or not a wife held real
estate of her husband under a parol trust ;63 as to whether or not
a parol contract was valid notwithstanding noncompliance with
the statute of frauds ;66 as to whether, under the circumstances
given in evidence, title to goods sold had passed as to seller's
creditors ;07 the right of creditors to property sold to the wife
of the defendant was declared ;G8 and title to personal property
was settled ;69 as to whether good title to certain hereditaments
61 XXV R. 5.
03 H. Newsum & Co. v. Bradley, 2 K. B. 112.
64 In re: Ma. 2 Chan. 126, 117 L. Tn. S. 401.
61 Gascoigne v. Gascoigne, 1 K. B. 223.
66 Lovesy v. Palmer, 2 Chan. 233, 114 L. T. N. S. 1033.
67 Pictehett, G. E. P. Storage Company v. Currie, 2 Chan. 515, 115 L.
T. N. S. 325.
08 Walker v. Brown, 36 Ont. L. R. 287.
69 Rawlinson v. Mort, 93 L. T. N. S. 555.
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had been shown by an abstract in accordance with a contract
was declared. 70 Proceedings for the purpose of declaring
the legitimacy of a person was entertained ;71 although the court
in a later case72 refused to make a declaration as to the legiti-
macy of a person on the ground that jurisdiction to pass upon
the question was controlled by the Legitimate Declaration Act.73
The right of children between designated ages who were resi-
dents of certain places to attend specified schools was decided ;74
and declaration was made that the defendant sewer district was
not entitled to send sewage from its district into plaintiff's sewer
without the consent of the plaintiff.75 The court made a declara-
tion that an adjoining property owner was not entitled to an
easement over the plaintiff's land for light and air in respect
of any of the windows or openings or otherwise ;76 a declaratory
judgment was rendered as to whether plaintiff was exempt from
military service under the circumstances stated.77 A declara-
tion was made as to the validity of a notice to quit ;78 a declara-
tion was sought by a solicitor to the effect that he was entitled
to a charge upon certain property recovered in the prosecution
of certain action ;79 and the validity of a resolution passed at a
meeting of the company was declared upon whether it con-
formed with the law,80 and a declaration as to the right of a
telephone company to a certain right of way ;81 and it was deter-
mined that plaintiff was entitled to a supply of water from a
certain farm on the theory of an appurtenance;82 it was deter-
mined as to whether or not the plaintiff was liable for a license
tax before engaging in his business;83 the question of the citi-
zenship of the plaintiff was determined ;84 and it was determined
70 In re Schafer v. Randall's Contract, 2 Chan. 8, 114 L. T. N. S. 1076.
71Beresford v. Attorney General, 118 L. T. N. S. 133.
72 West v. Sackville, 2 Chan. 378.
73 Gateshead Union v. Durham County Council, 1 Chan. 146, 117 L. T.
N. S. 796.
74St. Mary v. Hornsey Urban District Cownoil, 1 Chan. 695, 82 L. T.
N. S. 580.
75 Ankerson v. Connelly, 2 Chan. 544, 94 L. T. N. S. 717.
76 Flint v. Attorney General, 1 Chan. 216.
17 Bedington v. Wildman, 1 Chan. 559, 124 L. T. N. S. 561.
78 Egen, 2 K. B. 333, 123 L. T. N. S. 134.
79 Wise v. Lansdaall, 1 Chan. 420, 124 L. T. N. S. 503.
80 Rex v. Cheshire County Court Judge, 90 L. J. K. B. N. S.
81 Adamson v. Bell Telephone Co., 48 Ont. L. R. 724.
82 Westwood v. Haywood, 90 L. J. Chan. N. S. 515.
83 Little u. Attorney General, 60 D. L. R. 335.
84 Markwald v. Attorney General, 1 Chan. 348, 122 L. T. N. S. 603.
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as to whether or not there was an infringement of the copy-
right.S8
So, it is to be observed, where the action of declarator has
been available in the past, it has been applied to a great multi-
tude and variety of cases, whether foundation for the action
rested upon a writing or not. Numerous other instances of the
applicability and efficacy of the law might be suggested, to-wit:
to determine the location of a property line between parties;
to define the duties of adjoining property owners in regard to
party walls-their maintenance and restoration; to determine
relative rights in event of fire under an insurance policy between
occupying tenant for a period of years, and the landlord, so that
proper insurance might be written by the respective parties and
spare payment of unnecessary premiums for which there can
be no corresponding recovery in event of loss; unfair trade com-
petition; the status and authority of an agent as between the
principal and the one with whom the agent deals, where there
has not arisen a cause of action; the terms of an oral lease; the
terms of a contract to pay for services after death and before
death; questions of rights between vendor and vendee, and, in
fact, to protect every applicant against being required to take a
step or adopting a policy which is bound to affect his substantial
rights, without being able before-hand to know definitely how
his rights will be affected. No valid reason is perceived why
declaratory relief cannot be granted as supplemental of, or an-
cillary to, the relief prayed in causes heretofore recognized as
causes at law or in equity. The occasion for such supplemental
relief frequently arises in ordinary actions, e. g., an action in
,ejectment by a life tenant where the defendant might seek to
have established his right to the remainder; a decree of- injunc-
tion against the use of a trade name, where the defendant wishes
to have established his right to use one similar to the one en-
joined against, etc.
DETERMINATION OF VALIDITY OF STATUTES
"Any person interested * * * whose right, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity, arising under
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise, and obtain a
declaration of right, status or other legal relations thereunder."
This opens a vast field for immediate, definite, certain, and
expeditious determination of the validity of all statutes and ordi-
nances, which, under the pre-existing state of affairs, could only
s5 Dunston v. Winox, 1 Chan. 664, 37 T. L. R. 361.
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be tested by violating the law or by injunctive relief against offi-
cials charged with the duty of enforcement on the threat to en-
force the statute if the plaintiff violates it. The constitution
does not grant to the citizen full and adequate protection if he
must technically break a law, threaten to break it, or be threat-
ened with punishment if he does break it, in order to secure a
determination as to its validity. Indiana is one of the few states
which hold that no mandate will lie against a public officer to
compel him to do some act or thing the doing of which would,
in terms, violate an ordinance or statute, even though the same
be unconstitutional. The theory of this holding is that the right
to mandatory relief must be clear and certain, and the officer is
obliged to obey the ordinances and statutes, though unconstitu-
tional, until the courts have determined their invalidity.86 It is
rather singular that in one case the Supreme Court of IndianaT
affirmed the lower court and awarded a writ of mandate against
the secretary of state, notwithstanding it involved the holding
of a statute as unconstitutional by the secretary of state, and,
therefore, his disregard thereof. The point was made, but not
discussed in the opinion, that it could not be held unconstitutional
by mandamus proceedings in face of the precedents. Shortly
afterwards the Supreme Court again reverted to the prior de-
cision and held such proceeding by mandate inadmissible. 88 It
must, however, be held that Indiana is committed to the proposi-
tion that the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance cannot
be tested by mandamus against an officer who must disregard the
statute if the mandate is to be obeyed.
Particularly useful will an action of declarator be found in
regard to the numerous zoning acts, and the various sections
thereof involved, in the construction, interpretation and deter-
mination of the validity thereof, without necessitating resort to
injunctional proceedings or.a violation of the law before secur-
ing a judicial determination thereon.
SECTION 3
"A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a
breach thereof."
We assume this means oral as well as written contracts.
Inter partes this remedy will prove influential in avoiding litiga-
tion of an expensive character and the hazard of breaching a
86 State v. Winterrow, 174 Ind. 592, and State ex rel. Rabb v. Holmes
et al., 147 N. E. (Ind. Sup.) 622.
87 Jackson, Secretary of State, v. State, 142 N. E. 423, 194 Ind. 248.
88 State ex rel Robb v. Holmes et al., 147 N. E. 622.
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contract because one or the other (even on advice of able coun-
sel) has misconstrued it.
C
SECTION 4
"Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator,
devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin or cestui que trust, in the administration
of a trust or of the state of a document in infant (sic) lunatic, or insolvent,
may have a declaration of rights or legal relation in respect thereto."
There is manifest verbal error in this part of Section 4, and
we believe the latter part of the general provision is meant to
read
"in the administration of a trust or of the estate of a decendent, an infant,
lunatic, or insolvent," etc.
This section does not materially enlarge the rights of those
enumerated thereunder, as heretofore recognized in the state.
Particularly unnecessary was Section 4 in virtue of Section 5,
which provides that the enumeration therein "does not limit or
restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in Section
1" unless it means thereby that declaratory judgments may be
entered, in reference to the enumerated classes, even though the
declaratory relief obtained will not admit of a "judgment or
decree which will terminate the controversy or remove an un-
certainty."
Section 5 undoubtedly means to avoid a construction of the
act under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, on the theory that
where particulars follow a general declaration or statement of
powers or properties, the particulars will control and the gen-
eralities will be confined to such as partake of the nature of the
particulars8 9 That this was the legislative purpose, is borne
out by Section 12 providing for a liberal construction of the act
and its application and operation.
SECTION 6
"The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or
decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings."
This section eliminates the objection of invalidity because a
court may be called upon to decide moot questions. A good illus-
89 Strange v. Board of Commissioners of Grant County, 173 Ind. 640;
U. S. Cement Company v. Cooper, 172 Ind. 599; Wiggins v. State, 172 Ind.
78; Miller v. State, 121 Ind. 294; State ex rel. Shanks v. Board of Commis-
sioners, 162 Ind. 183; LaPorte Carriage Co. v. Sullender, 165 Ind. 290;
State ex rel. Board v. Jackson, 168 Ind. 384.
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tration is that of a tenant whose lease contains a provision re-
quiring the tenant to pay, on the commencement of the second
year of his term, a monthly rental of one per cent of"the then
market value of the property, to be determined by two apprais-
ers. Another provision of the lease requires the tenant to pay
his rent monthly in advance, and on the failure so to pay his
rent, his lease determines. The landlord insists that the ap-
praisement must take place before the beginning of the second
year. The tenant contends it cannot be fixed until after the ter-
mination of the first year, because the appraisers cannot estab-
lish the value of the property until the time has arrived for its
determination. The landlord appoints an appraiser a month
before the termination of the first year. The tenant refuses to
appoint one. A declaratory judgment in these circumstances
in behalf of the tenant would eliminate the risk of the tenant
standing on his construction of the lease and then finding that
he has defaulted in his rent, and a decision thereon would defi-
nitely terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to
the proceedings.
However, take another lease, with the provision that the ap-
praisers shall meet the last month of the term, and determine
the value of the property. The appraisers have met but failed
to agree on its value, and the court is asked to ascertain whether
the value shall be as of the time of the appraisement or as of
the beginning of the subsequent term. The court's determina-
tion of this question would not determine the controversy be-
tween the parties in view of the disagreement of the appraisers
(it not being shown to be predicated solely Ulpon the difference
in time as to which value shall relate). What should have been
prayed for in such ease, is a declaratory judgment as to the
method of procedure where no umpire has been provided for to
resolve differences between the appraisers. In like manner the
case of the establishment of a restrictive provision in a deed to
the effect that no building shall be constructed nearer than fif-
teen feet to the street line. The grantee contends that he has a
right to construct an open porch that extends nearer than fifteen
feet to the street line. The grantor contends he has not. In
the course of the hearing it is not shown that definite plans are
laid for any particular kind of porch to be constructed. A deter-
mination of the question of encroachment (unless the court
should determine that all porches-regardless of character-con-
stitute a violation of the restriction) will not solve the question
and finally settle nothing between the parties. The court will
not lend itself to decide a moot question. However, if it were
I
UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
determined by the grantee to construct a porch of a particular
design which he can describe in detail, so far as material, and
he brings the suit for the purpose of determining whether he
can construct that particular kind of porch, the court may defi-
nitely and decisively determine the controversy.
The section does not say that the court shall refuse to enter
or render a declaratory judgment in such circumstances, but
the word is "may." What discretion has the court to enter a
declaratory judgment which does not terminate the uncertainty
or controversy giving rise to the proceedings? What effect has
a declaratory judgment where the court has exercised its discre-
tion in favor of such a declaration, notwithstanding nontermina-
tion of the controversy. We believe if the adjudication does not
possess the characteristics of finality it has no greater authority
than obiter dicta in an opinion. It is brutum fulmen. If the
declaration is so uncertain and indefinite, it has settled nothing.
For illustration: A's contract with B provides for a commission
of one per cent on all sales, and necessary traveling expenses.
Breach of contract by either party entitles the other to termi-
nate, and liquidated damages. B does not want A to terminate
but believes A is claiming too much expense-that traveling ex-
pense does not comprehend repairs to the automobile he uses,
but only fuel, lubrication and storage. B applies for a declara-
tion of right under the contract. The court declares that ordi-
nary repairs are embraced. The decision settles nothing-unless
it establishes that some repairs may be charged for. Had the
declaration been that all repairs necessitated by travel-as dis-
tinct from those rendered necessary through inherent defects in
the mechanism of the automobile-are allowable, the decision
would have been definite. So also had the judgment been tha
re-tiring and repairs directly due to operation on duty were in-
cluded as traveling expenses.
SECTION 7
"All orders, judgments and decrees under this act may be reviewed
as other orders, judgments, and decrees."
This section undoubtedly also permits appeals to courts of
general jurisdiction from justice courts, if justice courts are to
have jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments. The mode
of review undoubtedly is the same as in any other proceedings.
A new trial would be asked; conclusions of law could be stated
on special findings of fact, and the same remedies for appeal to
courts of review allowable. We presume a ruling on a demurrer
addressed to a complaint, when the complaint states insufficient
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
facts to grant any relief, would be reviewable under this sec-
tion. In general, we presume substantially the same pleadings
and procedure is intended in actions of declarator as in other
proceedings.
SECTION 8
"Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefore shall be
by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the appli-
cation be deemed sufficient the court shall, on reasonable notice, require
any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory
judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be granted
forthwith."
Casual perusal of this section does not give expression to its
great significance. As an instrument of summary relief, it can
be used with effect in numerous cases. Take the case of promis-
sory note. The maker has stated, on the note falling into the
hands of an innocent purchaser, and his receiving notice of that
fact, that he does not intend to pay at maturity, because the same
was procured from him by fraud. The holder institutes a pro-
ceeding for a declaratory judgment before maturity to show his
status as an innocent purchaser for value. He accomplishes the
object before maturity. On maturity of the note, the note is not
paid. Summary relief will be granted him by filing his applica-
tion setting up the declaratory judgment, the maturity of the
note since, and its non-payment. Delay of four or five months
incident to an ordinary action before the case can be put to trial,
will be obviated. Take the case of a landlord. The tenant ad-
vises the landlord that his lease runs from year to year because
his leasehold is agricultural land. The landlord contends that
the land is not agricultural but residential land. The landlord
wants to be in a position to terminate the tenancy on thirty
days' notice. It is a general tenancy. Proceedings to declare
the status are commenced in justice court and the status deter-
mined. The landlord later gives thirty days' notice, but tenant
refuses to vacate. Summary relief is available.
SECTION 9
"When a proceeding under this act involves the determination of an
issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the same manner
that issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the
court in which the proceeding is pending."
This undoubtedly authorizes trial by jury if demanded, on any
question of fact properly triable under existing rules, to a jury,
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and removes any constitutional objection that the act infringes
on Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of our Constitution preserving
the right to trial by jury. So, likewise, in equity cases, the
court may take the advice of the jury on questions of, fact, as
heretofore.
SECTION 10
"In any proceeding under this act the court may make such award of
costs as may be deemed equitable and just."
The court would have the right to apportion the costs or tax
them against either one of the parties. The section is susceptible
to the construction that the items of cost taxable lie within the
discretion of the court to determine. So where the court ap-
points experts for the purpose of determining some question of
fact, who testify as witnesses in the cause, such experts' com-
pensation, over and above statutory witness fees, could be taxed
as costs. It does not confine or restrict the court to award tax-
able costs, and it appears that the wording of the statute would
justify inclusion of attorney's fees. "Award" signifies some-
thing above the actual taxable costs as now assessed. Had the
legislature intended to restrict the court to the power to adjudge
division inter partes of the statutory costs, it would have used
the term "apportionment" or "division" or "assessment" of tax-
able costs. By the use of the term "award" it was intended
that a judicial discretion should supplant the old statutory pro-
vision that taxable cost should be adjudged against the losing
party, and also grants discretionary control over the items tax-
able, and their respective amounts. In other words, the whole
matter of taxing costs and against whom taxable, has been
lodged in the discretion of the court, and is not, under this act,
a ministerial duty of the clerk.
SECTION 11
"When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration,
and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
proceedings."
Section 20 of the civil code 0 and the construction placed there-
on by the courts of review in this state, will solve all questions
as to who shall be made parties defendant to" be bound by the
decree; and as to who are necessary, and who are proper parties.
90 Burns' R. S. 1926, Section 276; De. Charette -v. St. Matthews Bank &
Trust Co., 283 S. W. 410.
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Privies to any party to the action, assignee, or grantee, devisees,
or heirs, will be bound like the person who is actually made party.
"In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance
or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party and shall be entitled
to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance, or franchise is alleged to be
unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state shall also be served with
a copy of the proceedings and entitled to be heard."
This portion of Section 11 is somewhat awkwardly drawn. By
"such municipality" is undoubtedly meant the municipality which
has granted the franchise or enacted the ordinance. It surely
cannot mean that when a particular section of a zoning ordi-
nance in one city is assailed as invalid, every municipality hav-
ing a like provision must be notified, or made a party to the pro-
ceedings. Nor can it mean that every other municipality having
an interest in the particular ordinance or franchise assailed, be-
cause of some contractural relationship with the city enacting
the ordinance, must be made party.
This is a considerable departure from the usual proceedings
involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance. Indi-
viduals inter sese have frequently had such question determined,
where one claims a right under such ordinance, without partici-
pation by or notice to the municipality. The requirement that
the municipality be made a party, is a salutary one. As the gen-
eral topic of franchises by municipalities has been constricted
to practically a nullity, due to the governance of public service
commissions, not much attention need be given to that phase of
the statute.
It should be noted that in any action in declarator wherein it
is alleged that a
"statute or ordinance is unconstitutional, the attorney-general of the state
shall also be served with a copy of the proceedings and entitled to be
heard."
He is not to be made a party, but he shall have a copy, pre-
sumably, of the complaint and not of the entire proceedings. A
service of the complaint upon the Attorney-General and notice
to him of the pendency of the action and the time given for him
to appear, we assume, satisfies the statute. It is to be observed
that the Attorney-General is entitled to notice whenever in the
proceedings an allegation of unconstitutionality is made, whether
coming as the initiatory pleading, or any subsequent pleading.
No default, of course, can be taken against the Attorney-Gen-
eral. After he has had an opportunity to be heard, he may en-
tirely ignore the proceedings and subject himself to no default.
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He is not a party to the action. He stands in the position of the
prosecuting attorney in a default divorce case, and not as a
necessary or essential party to the proceedings.
SECTION 12
"This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status or
other legal relations."
Notice heretofore has been given to this section in regard to
its bearing on the other sections of the Act.
SECTION 13
"The word 'person' wherever used in this act, shall be construed to
mean any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated asso-
ciation or society, or municipal or other corporations of any character what-
soever."
The provision for treating an "unincorporated association, or
society" as a person, is of importance in construing the Act.
The Legislature here meant to render unnecessary the joinder as
plaintiffs or defendant, all persons belonging to the unincorpor-
ated association or society. It grants to them the quality of a
legal entity for the purpose of an action of declarator.
The fact that all municipal corporations are privileged to pro-
ceed or be proceeded against under this Act, will be found of
immeasurable benefit in determining the validity of ordinances,
contracts, improvement resolutions, etc., if any doubt or uncer-
tainty exists, particularly where important bond issues are in-
volved. Any taxpayer may be made defendant, and determina-
tion of the validity had. After a court of review has thus passed
on the question, it will, in all likelihood, adhere to any decision
rendered in the matter as to any subsequent appeal on the same
subject. Heretofore it has been very difficult to secure a decision
on such matters which would satisfy a purchaser of bonds.
SECTION 14
"The several sections and provisions of this Act, except Sections I and
2, are hereby declared independent and severable, and the invalidity of any
part or feature thereof, shall not affect or render the remainder of the
Act invalid, or inoperative."
We do not believe any section or any part or feature of any
section of the act is unconstitutional.
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SECTION 15
"This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it, and
to harmonize, as far as possible, with the Federal Laws and regulations on
the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees."
This section is a new feature in uniform legislation. Were it
to be given its literal interpretation, it would be unconstitutional,
for each sovereign state must be the judge of its own laws, in-
sofar as they affect its property and inhabitants, and the law
of each state must stand on its own foundation. At most, it
might be an admonition to the courts that uniformity is desired
-the expression of a wish, and not a mandate, to the courts.
In view of Section 14, we believe it does not affect in any man-
ner the remainder of the act. It would have been best to have
left it out altogether.
SECTION 16
"This act may be cited as the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act"
So, it is to be observed, the body of declaratory adjective law
-so necessary to orderly procedure-is rapidly taking form in
this country as it did in England when there introduced.
WILL THE BAR PROVE ITS UTILITY?
There has been considerable newspaper criticism concerning
the ineffectiveness of the Legislature of Indiana for the year
1927. If we discount and disregard every other piece of legis-
lation for that year, and preserve as a valid enactment the Decla-
atory Judgments Act, it will stand as a monument of great
legislative accomplishment. If properly used by the bar, as we
predict it will be, posterity will regard it as the most epochal
step forward in legal procedural progress since the adoption
of the code in 1852. Its provisions are a model of brevity, and
as all great charters of right and liberty, such as the Constitu-
tion of the United States, nearly every word is significant and
pregnant with tremendous potentiality. While it might appear
to some as a striking innovation, and it canbot be regarded as
the ultimate embodiment of supreme wisdom, it does contain the
germ and kernel of a power for good, a preventive, rather than
a cure. It is to potential trouble what a germicide is to potential
infection. Heretofore we have waited, and have been compelled
to wait, until the infection had focused and a surgical operation
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became necessary. Now, when the germ makes itself mani-
fest, we are able to sterilize the area and prevent the spread of
infection. The laity will rightly judge ill of us if we do not
employ this scientific discovery to its available extent.
NOTE
Since what has preceded in this article was written, there
has been published an extensive supplemental note on this very
interesting and important subject in 50 A. L. R. commencing
at page 42; and since compilation of that note, a few later
decisions illustrative of the principles formulating under the
declaratory judgments act are: Dodge v. Campbell, 220 N.Y.S.
262, holding remedy under the act available to determine dece-
dent's status under questioned divorce proceedings and a sub-
sequent remarriage as affecting title of his heirs to property;
Fidelity & Columbia Trst Co. v. Levin, 221 N.Y.S. 269, held
proper to adjudicate status of tenant who failed to give timely
notice of renewal of lease.
In re Brown's Estate, 137 Atl. 132, it was held by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania that uncontested points in a proceeding
for declaratory judgment, not averred to be likely to become
matter of future controversy, should not be decided in the
action.
In Moore v. Moore, 137 S. E. 488, it is held that under the
declaratory judgment act the auditor of state as an individual
may maintain proceedings against himself as auditor of state
by way of mandate to compel himself as auditor of state to pay
to himself as an individual certain money by way of compen-
sation under the inheritance tax law.
In City of Corbin v Underwood, 298 S. W. 1090, resort was
had to this remedy to determine the duty of the sheriff to trans-
port prisoners from the city jail to place of trial.
Two interesting and illuminating decisions have been recently
decided by the Court of Appeals of the state of New York. The
question of jurisdiction, scope, and procedure under the act
received considerable attention in Bareham v. City of Rochester,
et al., 158 N. E. 51, and in Westchester Mortgage Co. v. Grand
Rapids & L R. Co., et al., 158. N. E. 70,
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